NL-Outsidethebox [confederation]

Here is where WJM is getting his propaganda from

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3.5 SOME MYTHS, LEGENDS and REALITIES

There is a wide range of uninformed views, opinions and positions on the subject of overfishing in the Northwest Atlantic. The persistence of these, and the unproductive conclusions and unrealistic expectations they generate, requires some commentary. We have selected the following as the most representative examples of misinformed debate and conclusions regarding overfishing. We thought it important to articulate them and to respond to them.

Foreign Vessels Inside 200 Miles (10% cod By catch while indiscriminately DRAGGING for fish not pursued by Canadians) Some mistakenly believe that the foreign fleets which are overfishing are operating inside the Canadian 200 mile limit on the Grand Banks and, furthermore, that hundreds of vessels are involved. The facts are that the overfishing of straddling stocks takes place in those portions of NAFO Divisions 3LNO that are outside the Canadian zone and in the Northwestern parts of Division 3M (which also includes separate fishing grounds on the Flemish Cap). There are now less than half the numbers of groundfish vessels annually fishing in these areas than there were ten years ago ( They left because it is no longer economically feasible to fish Hence the 600 million subsidies Spain gives to it's overseas fishing fleets and the need to make side deals with Canada to be able to land like the recent one with Spain) (96 in 2003 compared to 213 in 1993. Parsons, 2005). Incursions into the Canadian zone have rarely occurred since the institution of armed boarding capability in the mid-1980s and the subsequent adoption of mandatory Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) by NAFO and the moratoria on several attractive straddling stocks.

Foreigners Out, Fish Back, Plants Re-Open Many believe that when foreign vessels are removed from the Grand Banks, the fish stocks will quickly recover and many inshore plants will re-open. (Please nobody in their right mind and certainly not the fishermen who know fish expect any such thing but doing nothing at all certainly won't help in the recovery)This belief is based on erroneous assumptions about the presence of foreign vessels on the Grand Banks, the recovery rate of fish stocks and the potential for plants to be re-opened. These assumptions produce unrealistic expectations. The first erroneous assumption is that Canada could legally exclude foreign vessels from the Grand Banks.(Why not it is our continental shelf just because Canada saw fit to allow foreigners to fish the nose tail and flemish cap by agreeing to a 200 mile EEZ and signing a side deal UNFA wit hforeigners when they knew full well the continental shelf extended out past this doesn't make it right nor does it change the continental shelf) A unilateral extension of jurisdiction by Canada would be in violation of international law and would be widely opposed by other states. (UNCLOS needs to be amended or have a clause include to ensure all continental shelves are identified not just those inside the 200 mile EEZ, fish don't know about lines on a map) The current law of the sea allows for freedom of fishing on the high seas, (High seas by it's very nature doesn't include the water above a continental shelf except on the grand banks?) unless fishing nations agree to be bound by the management measures of a RFMO. Even if foreign vessels were removed from the Grand Banks, it is by no means certain these over-exploited stocks will rebound quickly. (Quickly no but in the 14 years since the moritorium in 1992 yes, There is a clause in the UNCLOS agreement which allows for an EEZ outside the current 200 miles if a continental shelf is larger) The scientific community has emphasized that the cessation of fishing alone will not guarantee the rebuilding of some stocks. (But continuing to allow the unmitigated whole sale destruction of the bottom and indiscriminant fishing either outright or by bycatch will ensure no recovery) Furthermore, even if the fish did return, the assumption that all the fish plants in Newfoundland would re-open may also be false. ( this is bigger than the fish palnts this is about the fish) The plants that will benefit will be those operated by the holders of offshore groundfish enterprise allocations in these Grand Banks stocks. Over 90 percent of the Canadian share is held by two companies in Newfoundland and Labrador; the remaining portion is held in very small individual amounts by some five other offshore companies, only two of which operate in Newfoundland and Labrador. (Why are there quotas for fish being held by foreigners for the fish of our continental shelf) Moreover, the economics of the fisheries have changed in the last decade with significant implications for the cost effectiveness and competitiveness of processing whitefish in plants in Atlantic Canada. (So lets all throw our hands up in the air and ship everything of to China is what they are saying here OMG. China can't process fish if they don't have it and we have it)

Foreigners Out, Northern Cod Back The expectation that ending foreign overfishing would mean the certain return of the 2J3KL cod stock, is also based on a number of incorrect assumptions. As just outlined, the future absence of foreign vessels is unlikely and the current catch of cod outside the zone in 3L is so low, (less than 100 metric tonnes per year), that eliminating it completely would hardly influence the recovery of Northern Cod. There are so few fish now in the offshore areas of 2J3KL that zero foreign catches would have an irrelevant impact on stock recovery. Virtually none of the cod in all offshore parts of 2J3KL survive beyond age five; this is a far greater obstacle to recovery than an annual catch of less than 100 mt. in the NRA. ( Amazing the methodology being used here, really makes you wonder who's paying for this study and what the reasoning behind protecting foreign fishing really is.)

Allocations for Trade Deals There is a widespread misbelief that Canada has repeatedly given foreign fishing countries allocations of Canadian quotas (or condoned overfishing) in return for trade deals for industries in other parts of the country. This is one of the most often repeated, unsubstantiated and untrue convictions regarding the government’s approach to the presence of foreign fleets. Two of the most repeated examples have been allocations to South Korea for a Hyundai car plant in Quebec and to Russia for purchase of Western wheat. A more recent one was the claim of allocations being given to Spain (in the 1980s) for landing rights in that country for CP Air. The review of foreign allocation policy and bilateral fisheries agreements conducted for the Panel concluded that no such deals were ever considered, let alone concluded. (Gough, 2005). ( OK lets say there is some hint of truth to this, later on here they go on to say "Spanish officials threatened dire consequences for a pending sale by Bombardier but the deal proceeded anyway" So if Canada doesn't hand out quotas directly by allowing foreigners to continue fishing our continental shelf their inaction to stop foreign fishing on our continental shelf ensures trade carries on status Quo and sanctions aren't imposed against Canada Ontario's manufacturing industry. Half a dozen in one 6 pack the other it all amounts to the same thing our continental shelf is being used to garner trade concessions and protect Ontario's maunfacturing indusrty.)

Nonetheless, this idea is now so embedded in the collective consciousness of Newfoundland and Labrador that it has entered the category of "urban legend". The absence of evidence for its veracity will not deter those who believe; but it is such a serious "black eye" for the Government of Canada that we feel every opportunity should be taken to set the record straight whenever such allegations are made. (Propaganda to protect Ontario's Manufacturing industry to the detriment of Atlantic Canadians)

The closest that government policy ever came to using quota allocations to acquire commercial concessions was during the "markets access for allocations" period when bilateral fisheries agreements with a number of countries included commitments to purchase Canadian fish products in exchange for quota allocations. The commitments to purchase Canadian fish products under these arrangements were so unsuccessful overall that the policy lasted for only a very short period. In any event, they involved "fish purchases for fish allocations". Furthermore, Canada has never had a quota allocation agreement with South Korea nor have any allocations to Russia been tied to wheat purchases. The overall level of bilateral relations with Spain was so poor in the 1980s (even before its accession to the EEC) that a satisfactory fisheries relationship never developed. Indeed, during the Estai affair some Spanish officials threatened dire consequences for a pending sale by Bombardier but the deal proceeded anyway (Gough, 2005). Also, officials of the federal fisheries department, operating under the authority of the fisheries minister, negotiated all these various fisheries bilateral agreements; not foreign affairs or trade officials. All allocations of Atlantic Coast quotas to foreign nations ended in 1998 when no surpluses of any species could be identified in the Canadian zone (Gough, 2005). ( out and out lie because as they stated here earlier "Over 90 percent of the Canadian share is held by two companies in Newfoundland and Labrador; the remaining portion is held in very small individual amounts by some five other offshore companies, only two of which operate in Newfoundland and Labrador." So there are three foreign companies or individuals out of 5 which hold fish quotas. This probably doesn't take into account all of the foreign vessels which fly canadian flags of convienience to circumvent and hood wink Canadians into believing no foreigners are fishing our east coast continental shelf. Then there is the issue of quotas handed out for unprosecuted species and the 10% bycatch allowed due to indiscriminant and destructive fishing practices sanctioned by Canada inside and outside the 200 mile lie)

Custodial Management While custodial management is a concept that is neither clearly defined nor fully understood, it has widespread adherence nonetheless. The general view is that this unilateral approach can be easily taken by Canada but that the Government really does not want to act. There is a general feeling that this type of unilateral action must be taken; and that there are no good reasons as to why it should not be. The fact that this would be viewed as a clear extension of Canadian jurisdiction in violation of the law of the sea and in the face of widespread opposition is neither appreciated nor accepted as a reason for lack of action. (Hiding behind Canada's giveaway of our fish by not insisting the entire continental shelf be included in UNCLOS. Here in lies the problem a 200 mile limit should never have been agree too and Canada knows it because our continental shelf unlike most other continental shelfs extends out past the 200 mile limit. Fish migrate across the entire continental shelf so as long as there is one fish left it will migrate out past the 200 mile limit and be caught by the foreign fleets waiting for it to migrate into their nets hence there will never be any recovery of the fish until we controil our entire continental shelf and not just some arbitrary line drawn on a map to appease our foreign trading partners and protect Ontario's manufacturing industry.)

Perhaps the more pertinent point regarding this adherence to custodial management is the public perception that this arrangement would produce the ideal outcomes and results desired in the management of these straddling stocks, and the perception that it is the only way in which effective conservation of these fish resources can be achieved because all other efforts have failed. The Panel believes, however, as discussed later, that the same objectives can be achieved within the bounds of international law through the replacement of NAFO by a new RFMO. (A more detailed discussion and assessment of custodial management follows in Section 8.3.)
(In essence Canada doesn't have the political will or intestinal fortitude to protect Atlantic Canadians by abolishing UNFA and NAFO and demanding UNCLOS include the entire continental shelf and not just some arbitray 200 mile LIE drawn on a map. Fish know no boundaries other that those on the sea bottom. This isn't about man and his need to prosper it is about the fish and their need to survive. We have a obligation to ensure those Canadian fish share the same rights, freedoms and protection the rest of us observe by being apart of this country. Otherwise why be apart of Canada?)

http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/overfishing-surpeche/documents/advisory_e.htm

Did you even read this WJM?
Stopping all fishing on the continental shelf won't allow for a recovery. These people who wrote this report must be on drugs my god where did they come up with this stuff.

Overfishing My god people Over fishing by foreigners isn't the issue it is fishing period on our continental shelf

200 Mile EEZ Fish don't stop at any arbitrary line draw on a map. Their boundaries are the continetal shelf.

Straddling stocks. It is all one continental shelf how can they straddle what they have always known as their migratory pattern. They go to the edge of the continental shelf and turn back how is that straddling?
I could see the term straddling stocks if a continental shelf were shared by one or more countries but the grand banks is the continental shelf of one country and one province within that country Newfoundland/Labrador.

Custodial management. Why would we need to be custodians of our own continental shelf it is ours we own it out right and are responsible for it as well as should be the only beneficiaries of it. It is our birth right by adjacency. If I was born in Spain Spains continental shelf would be my birth right.

Highs seas by it's very nature and the fact that it exists in a document which determins a continental shelf means the ocean other than that above a continental shelf.

By using any of these terms you are buying into the idea that the nose tail and flemish cap aren't apart of our continental shelf.

Nobody is saying we are going to starve the rest of the world by claiming what is rightfully ours just that well it is ours and we have to take care of our own. If that means war ships so be it. Nobody can dispute that the continental shelf isn't ours Canada just needs the intestinal fortitude and political will to do what is right by it's citizens.


Update: Page 68

In listing options to solve this straddling stock management problem, Sullivan re-introduced the term "functional management". He selected this option after rejecting multi-lateral co-operation through NAFO, bilateral co-operation with the EEC and appeal to the dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS III as possible sources of a solution. He judged the NAFO route to be ineffective because the objection procedure allowed the EEC to legitimately do what it was doing in 3L outside 200 miles. There was no bilateral agreement at that time with the EEC; the multi-year agreement on quota allocations and corresponding tariff reductions under the Canada/EEC Long Term Agreement had not been renewed in 1988. The demands of the EEC for quota allocations could not be met at a time of declining resources, and the tariff concessions promised under the previous arrangements had not been fulfilled (Gough 2005). The provisions of UNCLOS III in respect of binding dispute arrangements were not in effect at that time, as the required number of countries had not yet ratified it.